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A way of seeing the world necessarily entails a way of un-seeing it. In the pages of JRI, we talk about 
insurance in the allied languages of economics, actuarial science, and statistics. These languages give 
us the means of articulating our arguments with clarity and rigour. But they also constrain us in what 
we can say. Then one can ask: what is left out? How much is there in insurance that matters and we 
find hard to talk about? 
“Quite a lot” is the answer, as we learn from Jarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee’s fascinating book on 
the reinsurance industry. From 2009 to 2012, the authors conducted a global ethnographic study of 
the reinsurance market, observing practitioners, particularly underwriters, as they went about their 
business. Their work is a contribution to the burgeoning field of social studies of financial markets. 
The theoretical focus here is on relations and practices rather than individuals and organisations – 
on how a global market is made through the common practices and understandings that 
underwriters enact. In parallel to theoretical arguments, we are treated to a number of captivating 
vignettes from the authors’ observations of underwriters at work, taking us from London to 
Singapore, from Florida to Bermuda.  
Reinsurance is a global and specialized business. Within particular risk types, underwriters form a 
dense network of personal relations and shared understandings – most people know each other. 
Market structure underpins this: reinsurance deals are typically taken on by a panel of reinsurers, at 
a consensus price. The process of obtaining reinsurance quotes by potential panel members and 
then reaching a consensus price appears initially like an application of game theory: quote too low 
and you drag down rates, quote too high and you are out of the deal. But much more is going on 
here. Cedents don’t just take the lowest price, as they want to make sure they get enough coverage 
and encourage a wide panel of good quality reinsurers to participate, with many of whom 
relationships of trust have been built over several years. Consensus pricing, the practice of applying 
the same rate for all members of the reinsurance panel, is itself talked about in terms of fairness and 
equitability – “everybody is in the same boat as me”, a cedent says. 
Loyalty works both ways. When disaster struck with the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in March 
2011, many underwriters had already provided their quotes to Japanese insurers for the 
forthcoming year’s reinsurance cover. At the time, rates in Japan were quite low, at a ‘soft market’ 
stage, meaning that that the 2011 quotes would in no way recover the actual losses reinsurers were 
about to suffer. Underwriters agonized about whether they should submit revised quotes. They 
mostly decided against it, hard though it was to justify to their own bosses that cheap quotes should 
be offered at a time when huge payouts were about to be made. But underwriters understood the 
emphasis that Japanese cedents place on long-term relationships and were wary of opportunistically 
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raising rates in the midst of a difficult time for the Japanese insurance industry. Underwriters shared 
an understanding that “Japanese reward loyalty” and acted accordingly. 
Such considerations also shed more light on the way that market cycles are generated. Cycles are 
often talked in terms of capital availability: when profits are high, capital floods the market reducing 
rates etc. But within the world of reinsurance, the concept of ‘payback’ is ubiquitous. When high 
losses are experienced, reinsurers will subsequently increase their rates. This is not merely a 
consequence of reduced reinsurance supply. Reinsurance underwriters explicitly expect that, as part 
of their long-term relation with cedents, they will be compensated for providing cover in difficult 
times. The role of uncertainty in this is crucial. It is hard to know what an appropriate price for a deal 
is, especially if highly specialized risks are traded, which can lead to unpredictable losses. Market 
cycles are more than simply an economic function; payback enables reinsurers to stabilise their 
capital flows over time and continue providing cover.  
The role of quantitative risk models that are used across the market, particularly catastrophe 
models, is extensively discussed by the authors.  Putting a price on a reinsurance deal makes it a 
financial object and thus comparable to other deals. The role of models is fundamental for achieving 
a degree of consistency in calculating quotes across deals, as well as across reinsurers on a panel 
reaching a consensus price.  
To further elucidate the transformation of deals into financial objects, two schemes for classifying 
risk types and underwriting practices are proposed. On the one hand, risks types can be classified 
according to the extent that they are standardized around given parameters and according to the 
quality of information that is typically provided as part of a deal. Standardization is often a feature of 
the line of business, with Property highly standardised, in contrast to specialty lines such as Marine 
or Credit & Surety, where different deals have unique characteristics. (The difficulty in standardizing 
such risks bears echoes of Knight’s distinction of risk and uncertainty, the latter arising exactly 
because of the inability to separate exposures into homogenous groups that would allow application 
of laws of large numbers.) Quality of information is often determined by territory: typically best in 
developed and less so in emerging markets. On the other hand, underwriting practice when 
calculating quotes consists of two overlapping elements, which the authors term ‘technicalizing’ 
(relying on modelling and technical rating tools) and ‘contextualizing’ (incorporating additional 
information such as the relationship with the cedent and market dynamics). 
The characteristics of traded risks then suggest how technicalizing and contextualizing are blended. 
For risks that are highly standardized and for which good information exists, such as US property, 
modelling is used to derive a technical rate, with context providing ex post tailoring and corrections. 
For specialised risks that are information rich but lack standardization, such as Credit & Surety, 
technicalizing and contextualizing engage in parallel, with various actuarial tools used and modified 
according to contextual factors.  
Frontier risks for which neither standardization nor good information exists, are principally rated 
using context: market rates, relation with client, specific information about the client’s portfolio, 
comparison with other deals... In an example of evaluating such frontier risks, we meet Ria, an 
underwriter working on a Commercial Property deal in Pakistan and a Motor deal in India. The 
information she has on those deals is summarized in a few pages – a world away from the Gigabytes 
of information used to evaluate US property deals. But Ria has access to context and tacit knowledge 
that allows her to take decisions even for such deals. Her way of evaluating reinsurance deals helps 
us understand how deep uncertainties are tackled with in her market of frontier risks: not by 
mobilising multiple priors or any such like, but through enacting shared practices. 
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The blending of technicalizing and contextualizing addresses something fundamental at the core of 
risk evaluation. A tradable object needs a price, a numerical summary of its characteristics. 
Modelling, where applicable, helps in generating that level of abstraction, by stripping the context 
away from specific deals, articulating their properties in statistical terms and creating a framework 
for evaluation that is acceptable across the market. But, within the practice of evaluation, individual 
underwriters’ specific thinking about context never goes away – it remains fundamental in the 
generation of quotes. I cannot put it better than the authors: “This relational tension between the 
standardising effects of models and the variation arising from individual contextual knowledge is at 
the heart of the evaluation process from which the consensus price on every deal emerges” (p. 88). 
So what does the future hold for the global reinsurance market, with its specialized risks and site-
specific practices? Jarzabkowski, Bednarek and Spee discuss recent market developments such as 
the tendency for consolidating (‘bundling’) diverse risk types, perils and territories into a single deal. 
This development is tied with insurers’ increased ability to quantify diversification effects in their 
portfolios and their need to demonstrate capital efficiency to their investors. Bundling risk allows 
cedents to reap the benefits of diversification and cede less business, thereby retaining more profit. 
This puts pressure on Reinsurance rates. But it also challenges the evaluation practices of 
underwriters, which have traditionally focused on single risk types, because portfolio effects and 
capital calculations require heavy use of actuarial and statistical modelling skills.  
The pressure on the reinsurance industry is compounded by the growth in the market for Alternative 
Risk Transfer (ART) instruments. Such products are attractive to investors outside the reinsurance 
industry, who are seeking to diversify their own exposures to financial markets. The capital providers 
behind ART do not share the practices of traditional insurance underwriting. The ART market dos not 
feature consensus pricing and payback, with their associated notions of reciprocity and loyalty. 
Reinsurance risk becomes abstract and commoditized. As the distance between capital providers 
behind ART and the risks underwritten increases and as diverse risks are bundled together, the 
emphasis on models and technicalizing also increases, at the expense of deal-specific 
contextualizing. The knowledgeable practices of reinsurance underwriters are thus pushed aside.  
The authors are concerned about such developments, reminding readers of the subprime mortgage 
crisis of 2008, which demonstrated the danger of writing products such as CDOs that are abstracted 
and remote from underlying exposures, the risk of which was ultimately shown to be poorly 
quantified by models. I have sympathy for this argument, though one would need to examine 
carefully the different ways in which financial and reinsurance markets generate systemic risk. In 
both markets reliance on models serves to coordinate market behaviour, though the pattern of 
endogeneity changes: model-driven decision making can worsen liquidity crises, but not cause 
earthquakes. It may cause something else though: an undermining of precisely those underwriting 
practices and understandings that address the very things that, as economists and actuaries, we find 
so hard to talk about.  
 
